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 One is not Born but Becomes a Person:
The Importance of Philosophical Mothering
Jennifer Whiting
 
Since this essay is partly about the importance, or lack thereof, of origins, 
let me begin by saying something about its origin.  It was conceived in 2001, 
for the first in a series of sessions organized by the American Philosophical 
Association to honor various philosophical “foremothers”.   The honoree was 
Annette Baier, who had been my colleague at the University of Pittsburgh for 
the last ten of her twenty-four years there, before she retired in 1997 to her 
native New Zealand.  And I was pleased to accept the APA invitation because 
I regard Annette as my philosophical foremother in the strong sense in which 
I regard my own mother as my mother: each is in an important sense – albeit 
contingently – my one and only.  I call attention to this contingency here 
because the importance of contingency figures prominently in what follows. 
As usual with forefathers, I must speak of my philosophical ones in the 
plural: but when it comes to philosophical foremothers, Annette is it.  Not 
only was I not in my formative years given the works of women philosophers to 
read; there was also only one woman philosopher, each junior, at my graduate 
and undergraduate institutions, and there were no women in the department 
at Harvard when I started teaching there.  So when I moved from there to 
Pittsburgh, Annette became the first senior woman to play a formative role 
in my philosophical development.  And she did this – like my own mother – 
not simply by being there, but by the care and support she offered and by the 
example she set.  I mention this not just to explain the origin of my essay, but 
to introduce one of its central themes – namely, motherhood and the various 
forms of it. 
My second, and related, theme is personhood and the various forms of it.  For 
personhood is a central theme in Baier’s own work.  It was the focus of her 1990 
Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical 
Association, entitled “A Naturalist View of Persons”.1   This view, according to 
which we persons are first and foremost animals, is best understood in terms of 
its opposition to what might be called “supernaturalist” views.  Baier opposes a 
venerable tradition, stretching at least as far back as Plato, according to which 
the sort of rationality characteristic of persons is a kind of transcendent or quasi-
divine faculty that sets persons apart from other animals.2    In Baier’s view, which 
is indebted to both Hume and Wittgenstien, reason is a highly evolved form 
of animal intelligence whose evolution was itself facilitated by the evolution 
of various social conventions and norms, especially those involved in the use 
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of language.   This view has long been a part of Baier’s mental landscape, and 
I have put in section [A] of the appendix some passages from the early essays 
collected in Postures of the Mind, so that you can see some early formulations 
of it.   I have also put in [B] a passage from her book on Hume, so that you 
can see the ways in which she takes this view to be Humean.  But I want to 
focus here on the more recent Presidential Address, quoted in section [C] of 
the appendix.  Here Baier seems to add something new – namely, an emphasis 
on mothers and their distinctive role in the genesis of persons.  This leads her 
to challenge prominent philosophical accounts of personhood according to 
which persons have mothers only accidentally, if at all.  Baier’s discussion of 
personhood has two primary targets.
First come those in the Kantian tradition, who give pride of place to the 
rationality and dignity of persons.  Here Baier quotes Daniel Dennett, who 
says: “One’s dignity does not depend on one’s parentage, even to the extent of 
being born of woman, or born at all.”3  Baier objects largely to the content of 
such views: she thinks, very roughly, that their accounts of what a person is are 
skewed by their emphasis – and in some cases their exclusive focus–– on the 
sort of dignity and rationality that philosophers have traditionally associated 
with mature (and often male) members of the human kind.  Baier takes this 
emphasis to obscure various forms of dependency that are essential to the lives 
of embodied persons, especially the asymmetrical dependencies of infancy and 
infirmity, the sort of dependencies that make trust (and anti-trust) far more 
important than moral theories (especially Kantian and contractarian theories) 
have traditionally allowed.   This is clear from the passages in [C] to which I 
shall return.
Baier also objects to what she sees as the narrow and excessively intellectualist 
conception of rationality associated with Kantian views.  As she explains 
elsewhere, Kantians tend to see it as the “main operation” of reason (or 
intellect) “to formulate completely universal laws or rules, which can be non-
problematically applied to give predictions, practical guidance, and practical 
criticism in particular cases”.4   Baier herself has a much more expansive 
conception of reason, as evidenced in [A1] and [A2], where she speaks of 
“reason” as “a product of animal intelligence plus culture-facilitated self-
consciousness” and associates reason with acting, not necessarily uncritically, 
in accordance with various customs.   In her view, reason is associated with a 
wide range of norms, many of them highly culturally specific.   And she sees 
this as an aspect of the naturalistic view of persons.  In sum, her naturalism is 
opposed both to the individualism and to the intellectualism that she associates 
with Kantian views.  
Baier’s second targets are those in the Lockean tradition, who tend to 
distinguish persons from the human animals with which they typically coincide 
and to countenance the possibility (either logical or conceptual) of persons 
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who come to be as a result of various non-natural processes such as the brain-
transplants, fissions, and the Star Trek style “teletransportations” imagined by 
Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker and other neo-Lockeans – myself I confess 
included.   I’ll explain these so-called “thought experiments” in the second 
half of this essay, where I’ll focus on Baier’s objections to the methods of neo-
Lockean philosophers, as distinct from the content of their views.  But I should 
explain here why I use the language of confession: Baier has no patience for 
such thought-experiments, which she views primarily as “male fantasies” that 
women philosophers tend to find “strange”.  “It is unlikely”, Baier says towards 
the end of [C6], “that women can pretend that new persons come to be in any 
other way than by being born of women.”  And she continues, presumably 
thinking of women like me, as follows:
Now of course many women philosophers do participate in 
the neo-Lockean metaphysical thought experiments, just as 
there are women Kantians and there have always been eager 
women adherents of patriarchal religions.  Women’s reputation 
for docility is not entirely unearned, and often it has been our 
best survival strategy.  
Here, Baier appends a note saying, “I myself meekly did the philosophy that 
men had initially instructed me to do, and rewarded me for doing, until I safely 
had tenure.” 
But I – speaking now in propria persona – have safely had tenure for a long 
time.  And I do not think that I am – or ever have been – all that docile.  So I 
wonder: what, aside from the fact that Shoemaker and Parfit figure prominently 
among my philosophical forefathers, explains my willingness to participate in 
neo-Lockean thought experiments?  Might I be less willing to participate in 
such thought-experiments if I paid greater attention to what Aretha Franklin 
would call “natural womanhood”?  
I mention Aretha because of the way in which Judith Butler has used her 
song to question the idea of “natural womanhood”, womanhood being, in 
Butler’s view, “a cultural position”.5  For what I want to do in the first part of 
this essay is to call attention to the cultural shaping of phenomena that Baier 
seems to regard as in some sense natural.  Hence my title: “One is Not Born 
but Becomes a Person”. 
This title – borrowed of course from Simone de Beauvoir’s famous claim 
that “one is not born but becomes a woman” – is meant to express both a point 
that Baier accepts and a point on which I disagree with her.6  The point she 
accepts is expressed in “Cartesian Persons”.   See, for example, [A4] and [A5], 
from which I quote briefly here:   
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A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough 
dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of 
personhood.  Persons are essentially second persons . . . heirs 
to other persons who formed and cared for them, and their 
personality is revealed both in their relations to others and in 
their response to their own recognized genesis. . .
Being conscious is not enough to make one a person.  For that 
we need Cartesian consciousness, consciousness of ourselves 
and our place in the world, not merely consciousness of the 
relevant stimuli to what is in fact self-maintenance in that 
world . . . Through participation in discourse, through being 
addressed and learning to address [i.e., through using second-
person forms of address], the child moves from consciousness 
to self-consciousness, and full Cartesian consciousness.
But this point tends to be eclipsed in Baier’s Presidential Address, where 
she stresses that “new persons can [not] come to be in any other way than by 
being born of women”.   So the point of disagreement expressed in my title 
can be put by saying that it is human animals, not persons, that are “born of 
women”: whether or not these human animals become persons depends on 
precisely the sort of social interactions and cultural processes that Baier herself 
tends to emphasize.7   There is thus a tension in Baier’s naturalism between 
her emphasis on biological facts and her explicitly Humean emphasis on the 
importance of contingent cultural practices.  The tension is most evident in 
the way in which she represents nature sometimes as distinct from culture (as 
in [A1]), sometimes as involving culture (as in [C1]-[C3]).  
One might wonder here whether what we see is really a tension, rather than 
a kind of development, in Baier’s views – a development from what might be 
called “first naturalism”, with a naïve focus on our biological inheritance, to a 
more sophisticated “second naturalism” that sees the evolution of (for example) 
language and other social norms as part of our natural endowment.   But the 
trouble with this “developmental” reading is that the emphasis on cultural 
factors is dominant in Baier’s early work, where she speaks explicitly of the 
way in which a creature with the capacity of judgment characteristic of persons 
needs to be able to “blend [its] second nature, as a trained rule-respecter, with 
[its] original nature as an intelligent animal”.8   Moreover, it is in her later 
work that biological or “first natural” facts – especially those associated with 
women’s distinctive role in reproduction – come to the fore. 
It is of course possible that Baier herself sees this as reflecting a true 
development in her thought.  But that seems to me difficult, and not just 
because I see moves in this direction as regressive.  The main problem is that 
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second-natural facts figure no less prominently in Baier’s later work than in 
her earlier work: what we find is simply a sudden, and in my view somewhat 
anomalous, emphasis on women’s distinctive role in reproduction.   So I see a 
tension.  And I want to recommend that Baier resolve this tension by adopting 
a more thorough-going “second naturalism” – one that acknowledges the 
important role played by contingent cultural practices in shaping our – “first 
natural” endowments while continuing at the same time to aim for the sort 
of reflective distance from our practices that allows us to weed out those we 
are better off without.9  For Baier seems to me to make two mistakes: first, she 
sometimes treats second-natural phenomena as if they were first-natural and 
so less open to change than they may ultimately be; and second, her explicitly 
Humean emphasis on the importance of second-natural facts sometimes leads 
her to be more sanguine about particular second-natural practices than I think 
she should be.
I should perhaps note here that Baier herself might not be all that worried 
about my charge of tension and might well resist my attempt to push her 
towards a more consistent second-naturalism.  For Baier is a self-confessed 
“anti-theorist”, who says that “no anti-theorist is a consistent anti-theorist, for 
only theorists give first priority to consistency”. 10  She aims instead at the sort 
of “fidelity to complex facts” she claims she learned from J.L. Austin.11  But still, 
the desire to be faithful to complex facts is no excuse for failure of imagination. 
And Baier’s deference to what she takes to be natural facts, including some 
second-natural facts, seems to me to lead to some curious – and in her case I 
think uncharacteristic – failures of imagination. 
I suspect that Baier herself would be more distressed by this charge than 
by any charge of tension or inconsistency, for she clearly includes exercises of 
imagination among exercises of reason and she seems at times to value them 
over the narrowly deductive exercises associated with the narrow conception of 
reason to which she is opposed.  Consider, for example, her praise of Shaftesbury, 
whom she takes to have included the full range of our mental capacities in 
his conception of reasoning, and so to have rejected what he (anticipating 
contemporary feminists) called the methods of “Gladitorial Pen-men”.     As 
Baier says in her Carus Lectures:
Since [Shaftesbury] valued all sorts of reflection, and reflective 
conversations, including those that were witty, irreverent, and 
miscellaneous in their topics and logical structure, Shaftesbury’s 
“reason” comes to include all of this.  No particular priority is 
given to arguments that force a conclusion on us, nor even to 
reflections that arrive without any coercion at some conclusion, 
over those that are more tentative and raise interesting 
questions. . . Descartes’s preferred unity, the imprint of one 
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thinker’s logical mind, is replaced by a delight in variety, 
miscellany, crooked mental streets, and entertaining byways.  
The art of the agreeable diversion becomes an exercise of 
reason.12 
So now for an agreeable diversion that will allow me both to explain where 
I think Baier goes wrong and to shed some light on the point of my sub-title: 
let me relate an incident that came to mind when I was reading Baier’s book 
on Hume, and found her referring to a passage where Hume notes that people 
often wonder why, in spite of the fact that mothers are often more illustrious and 
more virtuous, children are called by their fathers’ rather than their mothers’ 
names.13 A friend of mine once asked my niece Charlotte, who was then about 
four, why her name was ‘Goodman’ when her mother’s name was ‘Whiting’. 
After some serious reflection, Charlotte, who is quite a serious thinker, replied 
matter-of-factly, “that’s the deal”.  I later learned that my sister Emily has three 
answers for questions from her children that she either cannot or will not at a 
particular stage answer.   They are: “that’s the deal”, “get over it” and “get a life”. 
This brings me to the point of my sub-title: I cannot imagine anyone better 
from whom to learn the arts of personhood than my sister Emily, who engages 
in what I call “philosophical” mothering, not of a narrow intellectualist sort but 
of a broad Humean, even Wittgensteinian, sort: she knows more or less when 
and where justification must come to an end, at least for the time being, and 
communicates this lovingly but effectively to her children.  The point here is 
that little Charlotte’s reflection enabled her to produce what was in some sense 
obviously the right answer: “Get a life” would have been entirely inappropriate, 
and not simply because she was talking to a “grown-up”. Charlotte had clearly 
mastered her mother’s language-game. 
This example calls attention to some of the dangers of the sort of appeal to 
social customs in which little Charlotte, like Hume himself, engaged.  What 
Hume says about the question is that in the society of marriage men have the 
advantage over women, so that the imagination passes more easily in familial 
contexts to the father than to the mother, which itself strengthens the child’s 
relation to the father, as a result of which “children commonly bear their father’s 
name, and are esteem’d to be of nobler or baser birth, according to his family”.14 
This seems about as satisfactory as saying “that’s the deal”, which cuts rather 
more quickly to the chase.  And the problem with this answer is that it may not 
encourage sufficient questioning of the hands we are dealt.  Moreover it seems 
to me that there are places in Baier’s work where her appreciation of the need 
for some customs and traditions from which to start prevents her, sometimes 
in the guise of naturalism, from questioning things she should question.  
One remarkable example appears in Baier’s essay “Caring about“Caring”. 
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Baier speaks here as if the only way to rescue what she calls “homosexual love” 
from what she sees as its natural asymmetrical dependence on “heterosexual 
love” is to resort to technological means, such as artificial insemination, that 
she seems to think undesirable.    
The homosexual love, even when it dares speak its name . . . 
cannot see itself as a means of its own continuation beyond one 
lifetime.  Even if the wholehearted Lesbian who adopts a child, 
or bears a child by artificial insemination, wants that child also 
to be homosexual, she depends normally on nonhomosexuals for 
the continuation of the homosexual community.  Homosexual 
love, however imitable and contagious, is not a love which is 
fertile when it comes to perpetuating itself across generations.   
Should this matter?  Are we not all dependent on the fact of 
diversity for the preservation and continuation of whatever 
sort of caring we do value?  Do we not all need others not to 
be like us as well as needing some others to be like minded?  
Yes certainly, but a diversity of loyalties and styles of loving 
may be more problematic than a diversity of tastes in food, or 
in career preferences . . .
Why, one may ask, should we not will a pluralistic world 
in which homosexual loves flourish, but are dependent on 
heterosexual loves in a way the latter need not depend on the 
homosexual loves? . . . Of course [homosexual loves] need not 
so depend – if the human community became like a farm in 
which all reproduction was by artificial insemination, then 
no one couple’s or group’s ongoing sexual preferences need 
depend on others having other preferences.  Why do most of 
us not will such a version of a technologically feasible ongoing 
human community?   I leave this question unanswered.15
This is a remarkable passage, especially coming from a feminist who is known 
both for her imagination and for her attention to actual facts, both natural 
and social.  First, there is the implicit equation of ‘love’ with ‘reproductive 
sex’, which is ‘catholic’ in one sense but not in another: everyone knows that 
you can have love without reproductive sex and vice versa.16  Second, there is 
Baier’s tendency to privilege sexual over other sorts of preference in determining 
who is asymmetrically dependent on whom.  Actually, she privileges a very 
specific sort of sexual preference, excluding even heterosexuals who strongly 
prefer oral to other forms of sex.  For they seem to be no less asymmetrically 
dependent for their continuation on those who prefer good old-fashioned 
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reproductive sex than Baier takes homosexuals to be.  Why, we might ask, 
is Baier not more worried about their vulnerability?  Finally, there is Baier’s 
curious and uncharacteristic lack not only of imagination but also of attention 
to actual facts.  It should be obvious that gays and lesbians need not resort to 
artificial insemination in order to reproduce.  In a world in which artificial 
insemination was impossible and same-sex adoption was prohibited, gays and 
lesbians who wanted to have their own children would very likely – as my 
sister Emily would no doubt recommend – “get used to it” and start having 
reproductive sex with each other.17 
Given that this sometimes happens even in the actual world, it is curious 
that Baier fails to consider this possibility as an alternative to the technological 
solutions she seems to find so unpalatable.  Perhaps it is because she thinks that 
the homosexually inclined are so heterosexually challenged that they are likely 
to regard reproductive sex as even less palatable than artificial insemination. 
But this explanation is weak given well-known “second-natural” facts – such 
as the number of men who, perhaps succumbing to what Adrienne Rich calls 
“compulsory heterosexuality”, marry and father children in spite of having 
always regarded themselves as gay.18   I focus here on men because being 
heterosexually challenged is likely to prove a greater obstacle for them (than 
for women) to engaging in good old-fashioned reproductive sex.     
When a philosopher as intelligent and as highly imaginative as Baier 
overlooks the possibility of something that actually happens, we need to sit up 
and pay attention.  What explains this blindspot?  Perhaps the problem is that 
Baier has – or at least attributes to homosexuals – what she would consider a 
“moral prejudice” in favor of keeping sex tied to romantic love, and so thinks 
that homosexuals would find the thought of sex without romantic love so 
objectionable that they could not bring themselves to engage in it even for 
the purpose of reproduction.19   But the widespread prevalence of sex without 
romantic love renders this potential explanation weak.  
I suspect that part of the problem here is Baier’s conception of what naturalism 
requires, or at least recommends.  She seems to regard a person’s sexual orientation 
largely as a matter of his or her nature, and she seems to have a moral prejudice 
in favor of what might be called “natural” reproduction, by which I mean not 
only non-technologically assisted conception, but also conception involving 
partners who are both “naturally” attracted to one another and “lovers” in the 
romantic sense: she seems to think that it would in some sense be a good thing 
if same-sex unions were fertile, so that reproductive sex could be a “natural” 
expression of their partners’ love for one another in the way that it seems to 
be for a least some heterosexuals.  But this association of the idea of romantic 
love with that of reproduction – while not a pure coincidence – is arguably a 
culturally contingent phenomenon, and one that is not obviously required by 
naturalism.   For there are societies that have managed to reproduce themselves 
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in spite of lacking this association of ideas.  
One example is provided by the Baining people, whom I introduce here to 
show how the same “first-natural” facts can take on different values in different 
cultural systems, and can do so in a way that seems to me entirely compatible 
with Baier’s “naturalism”.    I rely here on the account given by the Cornell 
anthropologist Jane Fajans, in her book They Make Themselves: Work and Play 
among the Baining of Papua New Guinea (University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
Fajans’ title refers to the way in which the Baining, among whom there is very 
little of what we would call ‘play’, seem to view the raising of children in the 
same way they view other forms of agricultural practice – namely, as a matter 
of converting raw materials into socially useful products: just as they clear 
forests and plant gardens, and (perhaps more to the point) domesticate pigs, 
so too they take human infants, who play in the mud like mere animals, and 
“make” them into the sort of socially useful animals who can in turn form and 
then feed their dependents, both young and old.  
There is not the same sort of presumption among the Baining as we find 
among many peoples that the dependent creatures for whom one should care 
are primarily one’s own biological children and (in cases where age or illness 
renders them dependent) one’s own biological parents.  Adoption, even in 
cases where the biological parents are alive and well and continue to have a 
relationship with their biological child, is widespread.  And one common way 
in which adoption occurs is for a person or couple who takes a liking to an 
infant to start bringing gifts of food for it, thus establishing between it and the 
infant the sort of carer/caree relationship that seems required for the infant’s 
survival given the prolonged dependence characteristic of human infancy.   I 
mention this so as to call attention to the fact that what we find here is one 
among other possible cultural responses to first natural-facts, a response that I 
find attractive insofar as it privileges actual relations of care over mere blood 
(or genetic) ties.   For the tendency to privilege blood (or genetic) ties leads 
to well-known sorts of racial and ethnocentric bias.20 
But to return to the Baining, the biological parents are expected to yield 
the child to what we might call its “social” parents, and they typically do so 
without resentment, often adopting other children for themselves and raising 
them alongside any other biological children they happen to have.  Moreover, 
when couples have both adopted and their own biological children, they tend 
to favor their adopted children, often referring to them as their “true” children, 
the ones who will (for example) best care for them in their old age, presumably 
because of what might be called the “gratuitous” care they originally provided 
for these children.   
Fajans interprets these (and other) Baining practices as expressions of the 
Baining tendency to privilege voluntary social relations, which they see as 
distinctively human, over the sort of instinctive and merely biological relations 
10
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that belong to us simply in virtue of our animal nature.  And she connects 
this with the Baining tendency to experience shame in connection with the 
more “animal” sort of behaviors in which they engage, including both sexual 
intercourse and the sort of play characteristic of children.   Marriage is associated 
by them with the work of tending gardens and feeding one’s dependents, 
and is initially resisted by young adults, for whom it seems to have few if any 
romantic associations.  In fact, they often run away before they eventually “get 
over it” and return to settle down, typically with a partner of their parents’ 
choosing.  Here, however, we should note that the Baining attitudes towards 
the more “animal” aspects of human existence do not seem to be expressions 
of the sort of rationalist or intellectualist prejudice to which Baier objects: 
this is a down-to-earth society organized around subsistence farming and the 
preparation of food. 
Still, I can imagine Baier objecting that naturalism would oppose any 
tendency to view the more animal behaviors in which persons engage as 
shameful – though this might require her to admit that naturalism is opposed 
to many of our own (and others’) culturally shaped attitudes in sexual matters. 
But I do not think that naturalism as such is necessarily opposed to a society’s 
cultivating some such attitudes.  Moreover, one need only read the work of 
contemporary socio-biologists to see the risks involved in putting too much 
weight on first-natural facts. 
Reticence about sexual matters is one thing, but reticence about play – 
except perhaps foreplay – is another.  And I imagine that Baier would be far 
more distressed by the Bainings’ attitudes towards play than by their attitudes 
towards sex.  For she views play as one of the delightful “animal” activities 
in which persons engage, and she explicitly criticizes what she sees as the 
excessively intellectualist accounts of personhood given by Lockean and Kantian 
philosophers, who privilege the allegedly more “dignified” capacities of human 
animals over other equally human capacities, such as the capacities to tease and 
play.   But she tends in such contexts not to complain about these philosophers’ 
neglect of the human proclivity for various forms of non-reproductive sexual 
activity.  See, for example, passage [C4], from which I quote a bit here: 
And now we have got to that vital Kantian conceptual link 
between personhood and dignity.  To be a person is not to be 
born of woman, nor indeed to be born at all, but to spring 
forth from some fertile noumenal field of Ares fully formed 
and upright.  Some philosophers who, like Locke and Kant, 
distinguish our personhood from our living human presence, 
are willing to say quite straightforwardly that infants, who so  
obviously are lively and do have parents, and whose dignity 
is not immediately obvious, are not yet persons.  “Person” is 
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always a status term: by these philosophers it is reserved for 
those at least trying out a dignified gait or mien.   It is not 
our ability to tease or play (an ability which infants display 
better than most adults), but our upright stature, our would-be 
commanding presence, our pretensions to importance, that 
are decreed by the founding and sustaining members of the 
fraternity of persons to be the qualifications for membership.  
Persons, especially if they are men, matter, and they decree 
who and what matters.   “We are beings to whom things 
matter,” they self-importantly proclaim.21  Aristotle, who of 
course did fairly straightforwardly profess the belief that persons 
had accidental mothers and essential fathers, launched a still 
flourishing tradition of finding moral significance in our upright 
posture (ours, that is, after infancy and before the decrepitude 
of old age).  We are the descendants of homo erectus, we are 
told by our wise men the anthropologists.   (Could it be that 
men have a thing about uprightness?).22     
So much, then, for Baier’s rationalist (especially Kantian) targets and the 
substance of their views.    I want to turn in the rest of this essay to Baier’s 
attack on the methods of neo-Lockean philosophers.   But let me note in passing 
how effective, as forms of reason, Baier’s wit and irreverence can sometimes be. 
It might help if I began by describing Locke’s original thought-experiment 
and some of the neo-Lockean variations on it to which Baier objects.  Locke 
of course distinguished persons from the human animals with which they 
typically coincide. A person is “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason 
and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places”. But many human animals (including not only 
those with severe brain damage but even normal infants) do not satisfy this 
condition, which we might call the ‘self-consciousness condition’.23 With this 
distinction in hand, Locke argues (in two stages) that the identity of a person 
over time consists in the continuity of such consciousness.   Locke is thinking 
primarily of memory here, but not (I think) only of memory: he is thinking 
of everything required for the sort of responsible agency that we take to be 
characteristic of persons.24   In the first stage, Locke asks his readers to imagine 
that “the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s 
past Life, [should] enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon deserted by 
his own Soul”.   Locke suggests that in this case“every one would see” that the 
resulting subject – the one with the Cobler’s body and the Prince’s soul and 
consciousness – was the same Person as the Prince, accountable only for the 
Prince’s Actions.   His idea here is that continuing to have the same body is 
not necessary for continuing to be the same person. 
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Locke then runs a parallel argument suggesting that sameness of immaterial 
soul is no more necessary for continuity of consciousness than sameness of 
material body is.  He thus rejects, on similar grounds, both the Aristotelian 
identification of a person with her animal body and the Cartesian identification 
of a person with her immaterial soul.  On his view, a person’s identity over 
time consists in continuity of consciousness, whatever substances contribute to 
its production – whether they are one or many, and whether they are material 
or immaterial.  
Neo-Lockeans tend to be materialists who view the brain as the seat of 
psychological continuity in much the same way that Locke’s contemporaries 
were inclined to view immaterial souls as the seats and bearers of psychological 
continuity.   So neo-Lockeans tend to substitute talk of brains for Locke’s 
talk of souls.25  This has led to two important sorts of variation on Locke’s 
original thought-experiment.  There are many variations, but I shall to focus 
on what I call more rather than less’“naturalistic” variations, by which I mean 
variations that involve something as close as possible to the “normal” cause 
of psychological continuity – namely, continuity of a human brain or of some 
significant part of it.   For the use of such variations seems to me less vulnerable 
to some of Baier’s objections than does the use of further-fetched variations, 
such as the Star-Trek-type case exploited by Derek Parfit (who is one of Baier’s 
explicit targets).   
The first sort of more “naturalistic” variation asks us to imagine what 
might be called a “brain transplant”.  An early example appeared in Sydney 
Shoemaker’s Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, published in 1963.  Shoemaker 
later, in a passage where he is discussing Locke’s original thought-experiment, 
summarizes his original variation on it as follows:  
For those who are skeptical about ‘souls’, it may help to 
imagine a case in which what are switched are not souls but 
brains.  Suppose, then, that by a surgical blunder (of rather 
staggering proportions!) Brown’s brain gets into Robinson’s 
head.  When the resulting person, call him ‘Brownson’, regains 
consciousness, he claims to be Brown, and exhibits detailed 
knowledge of Brown’s past life, always reporting Brown’s 
deeds and experiences in the first person.  It is hard to resist 
the conclusion that we, viewing the case from the outside, 
ought to accept Brownson’s claim to be Brown, precisely on 
the basis of the evidence that he remembers Brown’s life from 
the inside.  This gives prima facie support to the Lockean view 
that personal identity consists in part in facts having to do 
with memory.26   
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The second important sort of variation – the sort I have used in my own 
work – asks us to imagine a person undergoing a kind of “fission”.   There are 
many means by which such fission might be imagined to occur, but I want to 
imagine a case which is more (rather than less) naturalistic in the sense that the 
means involved remain as close as possible to actual facts about human brains 
and how they work.  The most important such fact, which is known to us in 
part from experiments involving split-brain subjects, is the way in which each 
of the cerebral hemispheres in a human brain duplicates or can duplicate what 
goes on in the other.27  This leads to the sort of case Parfit asks us to imagine 
in [E1] – a case in which each of a person’s cerebral hemispheres, carrying with 
it consciousness of the person’s past life, might be transplanted into a separate 
body (perhaps a body exactly like the body into which the other hemisphere 
is transplanted).   In this case, we are to imagine two resulting subjects each of 
whom stands in exactly the same relations, especially relations of psychological 
continuity, to the original subject. We can call the one with the left hemisphere 
‘Lefty’ and the one with the right hemisphere ‘Righty’.  In this case, there is 
no basis for identifying one rather than the other with the original subject. 
And given the transitivity of identity, we cannot identify both with the original 
subject without also identifying them with each other: we must thus conclude 
that neither Righty nor Lefty is strictly identical to the original subject, though 
each is psychologically continuous with her.  
Neo-Lockeans like Parfit, Shoemaker and myself have taken this sort of 
thought-experiment to show two things: first, that psychological continuity is 
not sufficient for personal identity and that we need to add a non-branching 
clause to get anything like a sufficient condition; and second (and in my view 
more importantly) that identity is not (as Parfit puts it) “what matters” in 
personal survival.  Parfit’s idea is roughly that the original person surely survives 
fission, even though neither of the fission products is strictly identical with 
her.  I agree and have argued that that the original person would be justified 
in having for each of her fission products something like the sort of special 
concern each of us ordinarily has (as things stand in the actual world) for her 
own one and only future self.   In my view, the special sort of concern each 
of us ordinarily has for our own (as distinct from other) future selves no more 
presupposes their identity with us than our special concern for our friends 
presupposes their identity with us: special concern can be justified by other 
sorts of relations, in this case by psychological continuity even where it is not 
non-branching.   But I cannot discuss that here.28
The point here is that these more “naturalistic” variations differ significantly 
from the sorts of thought-experiments that Baier picks on.   To see this, consider 
Derek Parfit’s “Combined Spectrum” argument in passage [E2], which is the 
thought-experiment to which Baier refers at the start”of [C6], where she argues 
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as follows: 
Paradoxically, it is the very will to identify oneself as a lasting 
remembering self that prompts these generation-forgetting and 
death-transcending modern whimsies, if not of doing without 
parents, at least of switching one’s own for Garbo’s, if not of 
being immortal, at least of becoming a potentially endless series 
of successive “selves”.29   It is Locke’s memory criterion . . . 
that is thought to license these ignorings of actual biological 
origins, actual pasts there to be recalled, and to encourage 
these fantasized transfigurations, as persons wander freely across 
the gene pool, from memory to memory and from gender to 
gender.30   For strictly, on Locke’s criterion, a person is one who 
was born only if he remembers being born, was dependent on 
others only if he remembers the dependency.  The autonomous 
adolescent person, if he has succeeded in forgetting that he 
was a heteronomous child, can rightly disown that childhood 
as his.31   These fantasies of freedom from our own actual 
history, actual dependency, actual mortality, actual biological 
limitations and determinate possibilities, have on the whole 
been male fantasies, and many women philosophers have 
found them strange.   Susan Wolf sensibly says: “my reasons 
for being interested in persons never had much to do with 
my beliefs about their metaphysical composition.” Accepting 
a metaphysical “reduction” of persons into a sequence of 
conscious experiences or doings need not, she claims, in any 
way alter our conception of more-central-than-metaphysical 
aspects of persons as we view them and as we are concerned 
with them.  On a generous construal, we might see these male 
fantasies as the Y chromosome trying to disown itself.   It is 
unlikely that women, who have traditionally been allocated 
the care of very dependent young and old persons, will take 
persons as anything except interdependent persons.32   It is just 
as unlikely that women can pretend that new persons come 
into being in any other way than by being born of women, after 
a conception for which two persons are jointly responsible, in 
all cases except those resulting from rape or from the seduction 
of the non-culpably ignorant.33
One might suppose here that a man who stands by his woman while she endures 
the pains of labor would find it more difficult to forget this than does a woman 
like myself who has never even witnessed let alone given birth.34  Perhaps this 
is my problem.  But the important question here is whether even a woman 
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who has given birth should refuse to engage in the sort of thought experiments 
in which neo-Lockeans invite us to engage.  And the answer seems to depend 
largely on what the point of such experiments is supposed to be.35
If, as Parfit and I think, part of the point is to reflect on “what matters” to us, 
perhaps with a view to changing our attitudes in ways that seem on reflection 
more desirable, then it is not clear that we should be troubled by the fact that 
these experiments run contrary to natural fact.  For it is not clear what status 
natural facts should have in our reflections on “what matters” or on how we 
ought to conduct our lives.  This, in fact, is one of Hume’s most famous points: 
that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  
I wonder, for example, what attitudes (if any) Baier thinks naturalism 
would require or recommend if Parfit were to go out and get himself a good 
old-fashioned sex-change and then, after radical cosmetic surgery designed to 
make him look as much like Garbo as possible, to start dressing and acting like 
Garbo.   Is this the sort of behavior for which Baier thinks her naturalism might 
provide a preventative cure?  If so, how is Baier’s naturalism supposed to differ 
from Parfit’s own commitment to a secular and scientific world view?  Is it just 
that Parfit is more open than Baier seems to be to technological modifications 
of our first natural endowments?  If so, then shouldn’t Baier be more opposed 
than she seems to be to the benefits of medical technology?  And shouldn’t she, 
given her own emphasis on the natural contours of an animal’s life, be more 
opposed than she claims to be to circumventing the more severe infirmities 
of age by means of suicide?  Or perhaps to using medical technologies in ways 
that prolong life until such suicide comes to seem called for?  How, if at all, is 
Baier’s naturalism supposed to help us draw the line between those technological 
modifications of first-nature that are acceptable from those that are not? 
Suppose, for example, that Baier regards the desire for one’s own genetic 
child as many people regard it – namely, as a “natural” desire.  Would she 
think its naturalness supports hiring a surrogate to carry my genetic fetus to 
term in a case where my ovaries are still functioning but I have no uterus?  Or 
would what is arguably the unnaturalness of carrying another woman’s fetus 
to term tell against our allowing any such social practice?  Or would carrying 
another woman’s genetic child to term serve to make what is sometimes called 
the ‘gestational’ surrogate into the child’s natural mother?  This actual (though 
technologically facilitated) possibility of dividing the labor of gestation from 
that of contributing genetic material raises the question: what, if anything, is 
a “natural” mother?   If a “natural” mother is primarily one who contributes 
genetic material and/or gives birth, then it seems that an infant might – without 
any violation of the laws of nature–– have at least two “natural” mothers.  If on 
the other had mothering consists largely in giving the sort of primary care and 
help with socialization that converts a raw human animal into a person, then 
perhaps there is no such thing as a “natural” mother.  For it is not just adoptive 
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mothers who can do this: anyone – even a man – can in principle do it.36
Now that I have problematized the notion of a “natural mother”, I want to 
return to the case of the sex-changed Parfit, whom I shall call ‘Garbit’.   What, 
if anything, would Baier say naturalism requires or recommends concerning 
how we should treat Garbit?  Should we treat Garbit simply as a man whose 
fantasies have put him so completely out of touch with reality that he needs 
psychiatric treatment?  Or should we treat Garbit like a so-called “natural 
woman”, with the emphasis (following Butler) on ‘like’ and all the while 
reminding ourselves that there is really no such thing as a “natural woman”? 
Or should we treat Garbit as a woman, albeit an artificial one, perhaps like the 
“artificial persons” whose possibility Baier seems to countenance in passage [A4]? 
I am skeptical that naturalism, taken simply as the expression of a secular and 
scientific world-view, provides any answers to such questions.   
Similarly, if new persons were to come to be in some of the ways Parfit asks 
us to imagine, I am skeptical that naturalism, simply as such, would prescribe 
any particular attitudes towards them on their own or others’ parts.  I suspect 
(for example) that the products of split-brain fission would as a matter of brute 
fact tend to think it worth carrying on with most of the projects of the persons 
whose cerebral hemispheres they inherited, though they might have difficulty 
with certain sorts of projects, such as those involving a particular sort of body or 
commitments to marriages in which their partners did not themselves undergo 
such fission.   Moreover, I suspect that others would eventually “get over it”, 
viewing it as cruel or at least “politically incorrect” to proceed in any other 
way than by modifying social institutions and attitudes so as to accommodate 
the needs and interests of subjects who so resembled “natural” persons as to be 
indistinguishable from them to anyone (themselves included) who did not know 
the facts about their “origins”.   We might initially have a term, analogous to 
‘bastard’, to designate such “artificial” persons; but this term would, I suspect, 
eventually lose its social significance in something like the way in which ‘bastard’ 
has.  This may of course take a long time, and may require anti-discrimination 
laws and such.   But first-naturalism would not help us here: it would be moral 
arguments or appeals to second-natural attitudes and practices that would lead 
the way.  And we might in the end pride ourselves on our ability to step back 
from our initial prejudice in favor of those psychological subjects, interpretable 
by us, that resemble us in being “born of woman”.  Discriminating against 
similar subjects who are not “born of woman” might eventually be regarded 
as no more acceptable than discriminating against similar subjects whose skin 
color differs from one's own. 
Baier repeatedly claims that ‘person’ is a “status term” and I agree: but she 
seems to think that we are “stuck with it” in a way that I do not.   See for 
example [C7], which seems to me to contain a bit too much Humean “that’s 
the dealism”.  Societies have managed – even if only with great difficulty – to 
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dispense with status terms such as ‘peasant’ and ‘noble’.   So if we thought our 
lives would be better if we “killed” the word ‘person’, we could attempt to do 
that.   But I cannot dwell on this point.   I want to make two quick points 
before returning to the question how the products of neo-Lockean thought 
experiments should regard themselves. 
First, it seems to me that willingness to engage in the sort of thought-
experiments involved in imagining brain and split-brain transplants is not 
necessarily incompatible with the sort of anti-intellectualism that Baier 
takes to be part of her naturalism. A neo-Lockean can include all sorts of 
characteristics, and not simply narrowly intellectual ones, among the personality 
traits that must be preserved if we are to say that a person existing at one time 
is psychologically continuous with a person existing at some earlier time.  He 
might for example regard the persistence of a person’s scientific knowledge as 
less central to her persistence than is the persistence of her sense of humor. 
Locke himself – though commentators rarely note this – frequently mentions 
facts about a person’s concerns, especially her concern for the subjects whose 
experiences she seems to remember and to anticipate.   So I doubt that Locke 
would regard detached and purely intellectual memory or anticipation, even 
“from the inside”, as sufficient for the sort of psychological continuity and 
accountability that he associates with personhood.   And even if Locke’s 
actual views were objectionably intellectualist, it is in principle possible for 
us to develop the basic Lockean view in less intellectualist ways, in ways that 
emphasize (for example) the affective dimensions of psychological continuity. 
Baier will no doubt object that what she calls ‘personality’ is not so easily 
separable from the body in which it evolves as the brain transplant examples 
suggest, and that once neo-Lockeans include less intellectual characteristics 
among those involved in the sort of psychological continuity they take to be 
necessary for the persistence of a person they run the risk of having to admit 
that the relevant sort of continuity may in fact depend on the persistence of 
the personality in the body – or at least the sort of body – in which it originally 
evolved.  For Baier will no doubt claim that personality is typically constrained 
and partly shaped by the bodily conditions in which it evolves.  Here, however, 
Baier needs to be careful, lest she find herself having to admit that the extreme 
changes involved in paralysis or radical disfigurement spell the end of the 
person’s – as distinct from the animal’s – persistence.37
My second point is parallel to the first: it is that willingness to engage in the 
sort of thought-experiments involved in imagining split-brain transplants is 
not necessarily incompatible with the sort of anti-individualism that Baier takes 
to be part of her naturalism.   Assume for the sake of argument that Baier is 
right to suppose that even apparently individual intentions and actions depend 
on social contexts.  These points would not be threatened by the existence of 
someone like Shoemaker’s imagined Brownson, who has what was originally 
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Brown’s brain and what was originally Robinson’s body.  
Note in connection with my first point that Browson’s sense of who he is may 
depend largely on his affective states: whose wife and children he loves, whose 
job he finds fulfilling, and so on: there is nothing especially intellectualist about 
supposing that Brownson is Brown because he loves Brown’s wife and children, 
finds Brown’s job fulfilling, and so on.  Note also Brownson’s dependence on 
others here, including his emotional vulnerability to Mrs. Brown should she 
reject him – or refuse to trust him with Mrs. Robinson – simply because he 
has Robinson’s body. 
Note now, in connection with my second point, that if Brownson’s brain had 
not had the sort of embodied socialization that it originally received in Brown’s 
body, Brownson’s brain would presumably be incapable of sustaining the sorts 
of memories, intentions, beliefs and other psychological states that we are 
supposed to imagine it now sustaining in Robinson’s body.   And if Brownson 
suddenly found himself in an environment in which others refused to take 
his actions and utterances at face value – refused in other words to recognize 
him as the person he takes himself to be – he would perhaps lose his sense of 
himself as that person.  So if, as Baier suggests, his sense of himself is largely a 
function of second person relations – largely, that is, a function of the attitudes 
of those with whom he interacts – then his sense of himself will be dependent 
not simply on his upbringing but also on the ways in which others continue to 
interact with him.  
I want to conclude by attending briefly to the sort of attitudes that subjects 
of neo-Lockean thought experiments should have towards themselves, both in 
anticipating the changes they are supposed in some sense to undergo and in 
reacting to the changes they have in some sense undergone.38   Consider first a 
case involving anticipation, taken from John Perry’s dialogue.39  A philosophy 
professor who accepts a bodily criterion of personal identity is in an accident 
that leaves her brain alive and well, though the rest of her body is about to 
expire.  She is given the opportunity to have her brain transplanted into the 
body of another accident victim whose body is in good shape but whose brain 
has just expired.  The professor resists on the ground that the product, since it 
will lack her body, will not be her.   But her student, who accepts a psychological 
continuity theory, pleads with her to take advantage of the opportunity.  His 
argument, however, depends on the assumption that she herself will survive 
in the product.  Perhaps, though, her student should have taken a different 
tack.  Instead of arguing that she herself will survive, he might appeal to her 
present values to instill in her at least instrumental concern for the existence 
and persistence of the product, who will be psychologically continuous with 
her even if it is not strictly identical with her.  He might ask who would be 
more likely and better able than the product to care for her children (whom 
we may suppose to be without a practicing father) or for her aging parents 
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(whom we may suppose to have no other children and to be less likely than 
her own children to find a good “adoptive” home).40 The emphasis here is on 
social relations, not individual identity, and the argument is one that should 
move men, at least qua father and sons, as well as it moves women.
Moreover, we can imagine the philosopher eventually changing her mind 
and accepting the offer, in which case we can perhaps imagine the product 
having rather different views about what constitutes a person’s identity (or at 
least survival) over time.  The product, finding itself embedded in the social 
relations in which our philosopher had been embedded, might eventually come 
to regard herself as having undergone a mere body transplant.  She might thus 
become a neo-Lockean who recalls having once subscribed – mistakenly she 
now thinks – to a bodily continuity theory.   Or she might simply cease to care 
about the problem of personal identity as traditionally conceived – that is, as 
a metaphysical problem about identity in the “strict numerical sense”. 
Ceasing to care about this problem as traditionally conceived would  perhaps 
be more likely in the case of subjects who reflected retroactively on the fissions 
by means of which they came to be.   I have argued elsewhere that the products 
of the “naturalistic” sort of fission involved in split-brain transplants would 
very likely continue in fact to have – and would not be unjustified in continuing 
to have – many of the beliefs, attitudes, and projects they have inherited from 
their predecessors.41  There will be special problems about first-person beliefs and 
attitudes, and certain sorts of projects, such as commitment to a monogamous 
marriage.   But suppose that I were to undergo split-brain fission, and that each 
of the products loved the members of my family in the way that I do, especially 
my sister Emily.  For she would be there telling them all to “get used to it”, 
telling my parents, siblings and children – perhaps even my husband – that 
they should feel lucky to be loved by two Jennifers, instead of just one. 
I have dealt elsewhere the special problems posed by my husband, though 
I should note here that some of these problems stem from our participation in 
the contingent cultural institution of monogamous marriage in which people 
can always, even in the actual world, cease to participate.   The problems posed 
by my parents, siblings, and children are a piece of cake compared to that: 
for they in fact have and love – or could actually have and love – multiple 
children, siblings, and parents.    My children could even in the actual world 
have multiple mothers.  Suppose, for example, that their father and I split up 
when they are very young, but retain joint custody, each proceeding to share 
our lives with different women, who come to play for these children the social 
roles indistinguishable from the social roles he and I continue to play for them: 
these children might describe themselves as having one Dad and three Moms. 
So my children could perhaps “get over” having something like two of me.  
But what about my fission-products themselves?   Suppose that they, having 
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descended from someone who spent so many years studying philosophy, sat 
around worried about the problem of personal identity as traditionally conceived. 
Suppose they said things like, “Of course I feel just as if I were her; but strictly 
speaking that was her, and this is me.  It was she who formed all those beliefs and 
attitudes which I find myself tempted to express.  So why should I carry on with 
those beliefs and attitudes?  Those are her friends and family; so why should I 
love them, even if they do love me?”   Here, Emily might point out to my fission 
product that, although my mother did not give birth to it, there is an important 
sense in which my mother (together with my father) was largely responsible 
for its personhood: if they had not cared for her predecessor throughout the 
predecessor’s prolonged infancy, and if they had not initiated her predecessor 
into the arts of personhood, she would not be the person she is.   And if my 
fission-product kept on asking “but who exactly is that?”, I suspect that Emily 
would eventually be moved to reply, in good Humean fashion, “Get a life”.42  
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partly because of what I take myself to have learned from Baier: to attend in 
reading a philosopher’s work not simply to its letter but also to its spirit (i.e., 
to at attend to the motivations that are not always given explicit expression). 
Baier’s point, which she has now clarified in conversation, is that love 
involves the desire to procreate – i.e., to produce a reflection of oneself and 
one’s beloved.  And Baier cites the views of Diotima (in Plato’s Symposium) 
in support of this point.   But Baier needs to be careful here, since Diotima 
tends to regard procreation as an inferior form of the sort of creation to which 
she takes love to aspire, the noblest sort of love aspiring not to merely mortal 
products but to immortal ones like great works of art.   Moreover there are 
additional reasons for caution given the ways in which such views, in treating 
the offspring as ultimately a reflection or extension of the lovers, can fail to 
respect the independence of the offspring.   For more on this, see my “Love: 
self-propogation, self-actualization, or ekstasis?” (unpublished).  It is the threat 
of this sort of failure that I detect in Baier’s talk of “homosexuals” wanting their 
children “also to be homosexual” (on which I say more in the next note) and 
that is my primary concern here. 
17 I prefer to leave aside here the question of whether gays and lesbians want 
their children “also to be homosexual”.  For the idea that this is true strikes 
me as doubtful insofar as the members of sexual minorities seem to me (if 
anything) less likely to want to impose conformity to sexual norms on their 
children than are the members of sexual majorities (especially those who regard 
themselves as members of  “moral majorities”).   Moreover, it seems to me that 
homosexuals no more depend on non-homosexuals for the perpetuation of 
their communities than philosophers depend on non-philosophers, musicians 
on non-musicians, and so on, for the perpetuation of theirs: though it is true 
that some philosophers, musicians and so on are the biological children of 
philosophers, musicians and so on, the philosophical and musical worlds would 
be radically impoverished were it not for the fact that non-philosophers and 
non-musicians often raise philosophically and musically inclined children.  So 
the dependence of a certain sort of community on the fact that non-members 
reproduce themselves biologically seems to me not especially problematic.  Finally, 
there seems to me little reason to worry that heterosexuals will continue to 
produce children who turn out, for whatever reason, to be homosexual.  Nor 
does there seem to me any reason to worry that homosexuals who engaged in 
reproductive activity with each other would fail to produce some children who 
turn out “also to be homosexual”.  It is usually heterosexuals who worry about 
things like this, writing alarmist letters to newspapers, alumni magazines, and 
so on about what would happen if everyone were homosexual 
– to which I am often tempted to respond that there would very likely be fewer 
unwanted children and fewer concerns about the so-called population explosion. 
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18 Adrienne Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” in 
Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose 1978-1985 (W.W. Norton and Company, 
1986).  
19 This talk of moral prejudices stems from Hume, from whose essay “Of 
Moral Prejudices” Baier borrows the title of her second collection of papers: 
Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Harvard University Press, 1994).   As Baier 
explains in her Preface, she takes her essays “both to concern and to display 
moral prejudices”.   
20 For more on this issue, see my “Impersonal Friends” in The Monist 74 (1991) 
3-29; and “Trusting ‘First’ and ‘Second’ Selves: Aristotelian Reflections on 
Virginia Woolf and Annette Baier”, pp. 329-364 of Persons and Passions, cited 
in note 2 above.  
21 Baier is quoting here from the Introduction to Charles Taylor’s Philosophy 
and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol. II (Cambridge University 
Press, 1985).
22 See also “The Naturalist View of Persons” p. 10: 
Our capacity for play is, as Hume, Nietzsche and others have recognized, 
an important member of the skills of personhood.  Hume took this 
capacity to be continuous with that found in all the higher animals 
and to show itself in our case in our truth-seeking games, as much as 
in backgammon and chess.   
23 I quote from Locke’s account in the appendix, [D1].  
24 For a brief sketch of my reading of Locke (which I hope to develop more 
fully in future work) see my “Personal Identity: The Non-Branching Form of
‘What Matters’” in The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by R. Gale (Basil 
Blackwell, 2002) pp. 190-218.
 
25 There is a slight complication here, insofar as Locke was agnostic about 
whether it was really souls that carried continuity of consciousness.   But we 
can for present purposes ignore this.  
26 From Shoemaker’s contribution to S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne:
Personal Identity (Basil Blackwell, 1984) p. 78.    Shoemaker first presented 
the Brownson case in Chapter One of Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Cornell 
University Press, 1963).  
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27 For more on this, see Charles Marks, Commisurotomy, Consciousness, and 
Unity of Mind (Bradford Books, 1980).   
28 For my defense of this view, see “Friends and Future Selves,” The Philosophical 
Review” 95 (1986) 547-80; and “Personal Identity: the Non-Branching Form 
of ‘What Matters’” cited above. 
29 I might note here that Baier’s talk of “becoming a potentially endless series 
of successive selves”, though meant to target science-fiction type scenarios of 
the sort envisaged by Parfit, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s explicitly naturalistic 
idea that reproduction (in which a father makes another little “himself”, who 
will in turn produce another little “himself”, and so on ad infinitum) is one of 
the most natural activities of an animal: it is an animal’s way way of seeking the 
only sort of immortality possible for it – namely, immortality “in form” even 
if not “in number”.  See Aristotle, De Anima II.4.  
30 I take the reference to ‘gene pools’ to be a reference to first-natural facts, 
and talk of gender as a (perhaps unwitting) reference to second-natural facts, 
gender (as distinct from sex) being primarily a cultural phenomenon.  Baier’s 
point might perhaps have been better put in terms of ‘sex’, which is more 
biological and to that extent more first-natural. 
31 Please note the elision of the Lockean and Kantian pictures here.
32 I take this reference to the traditional gendered division of labor to be a 
reference to second-natural facts that may help to make the naturalistic view of 
persons come more easily – we could say “more second-naturally’’– to women, 
at least in societies like ours.  And I take the subsequent reference to persons 
being “born of women’’ to be a reference to a first-natural fact that may help 
to make the naturalist view of persons come more easily – perhaps even  “first
-naturally” – to women.  The important point here is the apparent (and in my 
view unjustified) parity with which Baier appeals to both sorts of facts. 
33 The conception of responsibility here is surprisingly individualist given the 
sorts of views Baier generally expresses elsewhere.  
34 Think, for example, of Levin’s behavior and feelings (as described by Tolstoy 
in Part VII, Chapter XV of Anna Karenina) during the twenty-two hours of 
labor suffered by his beloved Kitty.  
35 I discuss the much maligned use of “thought experiments” in arguments 
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about personal identity, and defend some uses of them,  in “Back to ‘The Self 
and the Future’”, which appears in a special issue of Philosophical Topics [1999]
 devoted to the work of (my philosophical forefather) Sydney Shoemaker.   
36 I’m tempted to say “at least in flat shoes and forwards”.  For a brilliant discussion 
of the work of mothering and who can do it, a discussion that shares one of 
Baier’s noblest “moral prejudices” (namely, her prejudice against excessively 
intellectualist conceptions of rationality), see Sara Ruddick’s 
Maternal Thinking:  Towards a Politics of Peace (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1989).  
37 If Baier can countenance the possibility that someone whose personality is 
such that it requires for its expression a handsome athletic body should survive 
permanent paralysis and radical disfigurement, then she should I think be willing 
to countenance the possibility that someone with such a personality should 
be capable of adapting to new (and perhaps improved) handsome and athletic 
body: for this may do less damage to his personality than would paralysis and 
disfigurement.   If Baier is not willing to countenance this, then she should 
perhaps revert fully to first-naturalism, and give up her own Cartesian talk 
about persons in favor of more Aristotelian talk simply about human animals. 
Note however that this is perhaps unfair to Aristotle insofar as he takes our 
rationality to be part of our animal nature and also recognizes the importance 
of our second nature.  Still, the “naturalist” reading of Aristotle is one to which 
I think Baier herself should be sympathetic, and it is certainly less eccentric 
than her reading of Descartes.    
38 I say “in some sense” here so as to avoid begging questions about whether 
identity in the strict numerical sense is preserved throughout the relevant 
changes.  
39 John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality  (Hackett: 1978). 
40  The instrumental argument in suggested by John Perry in “The Importance 
of Being Identical”, in A. Rorty ed., The Identities of Persons.   I argue against 
Perry’s merely instrumental view in my “Friends and Future Selves”, cited in 
note 28 above.   But I need not entirely eschew such instrumental arguments. 
They may even, in some cases, help to bring about the existence of the sort of 
attitudes that I take to be constitutive of the sort of psychological continuity 
involved in personal survival. 
   
41 See my “Personal Identity: The Non-Branching Form of ‘What Matters’”, 
cited above. 
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42 I must thank several friends for their help with this paper: Judith Baker, Tom 
Berry, and Karen Jones.  But I am most indebted to Emily Whiting for all that 
I have learned from her over many, many years.   So I want to dedicate this 
paper to Emily and her children: Caroline, Charlotte, and Nathan Goodman. 
Appendix:
Passages from Baier and her Targets  
[a]  Passages from Annette Baier: Postures of the Mind: Essays on 
Minds   and Morals (University of Minnesota Press, 1985).   
[A1]   These essays present minds as formed by culture as well as nature; 
our mental repertoire made possible by both of these; our beliefs, feelings, 
intentions, and actions showing that inheritance, as well as contributing 
to its continuation and development.  The inheritance includes “reason”, 
a product of animal intelligence plus culture-facilitated self-consciousness, 
and it includes other such joint mental products of equal importance.  I 
see this view as Wittgensteinian . . . I see mental states as the states of 
one who learns from others as well as from nature, who trains, criticizes, 
approves, works with, and receives criticism from others, and occasionally 
does need a representation of what is not present.  Mental states become 
the states of criticism-sensitive intelligent sensitive beings, characterized 
in terms that bring out the role such states play in the ongoing activity, 
receptivity, and responsiveness that displays us not just as intelligent 
animals, able to anticipate events well enough to survive, but as society-
dependent yet often antisocial animals, with inherited standards of 
correctness that we often try to disown, and with other fairly standard ways 
of displaying both our self-consciousness and the limits of it.   [“Varieties 
of Mental Postures”, pp. 5-6]  
[A2]   Thinking shows itself and reveals qualities of mind, as much in 
recognition of occasion as in working out of means to ends, or proofs 
of theorems, as much in observance as in observation.  The customs in 
which we were trained provide us with reasons that complicate, enrich, 
sometimes override those which animal purpose provides, and they 
prepare the way for those self-critical conventions, appeals to which we 
call reason.   [“Mind and Change of Mind”, pp. 60-61] 
[A3]  [W]hile Descartes does not see speech as essential to thought, he 
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does see some essential features of speech to be central features of thought. 
Dependency on another for standards of correctness, and the capacity 
for meaningful acts as distinct from passive undergoings, are essential 
to Cartesian thinkers whether or not they are embodied and thinking 
persons.  It is not clear whether Cartesian finite thinking things could 
recognize one another’s thought if they were not embodied, whether, that 
is, any test of appropriate response could then apply.  However, there is 
no doubt that the Cartesian person, the one who acts and seeks its good 
in this world, does speak and engage in other activities whose norms, 
like those of speech, derive from a human community, not merely from 
a single creature’s intimacy and [sic] with its divine creator.  [“Cartesian 
Persons,” pp. 79-80]  
[A4]  A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough 
dependent on other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. 
Persons are essentially second persons, who grow up with other persons. 
This way of looking at persons makes it essential to them that they 
have successive periods of infancy, childhood, and youth, during which 
they develop as persons . . . Persons make calendars, write day by day 
meditations, celebrate anniversaries, recognize each other’s transitions 
from one stage to another, conduct funerals.   These typical activities 
involve recognition of the normal development of a life, as well as of the 
distinctive way in which a given individual has passed through its stages. 
The fact that a person has a life’history,’and that a people collectively have 
a history, depends on the humbler fact that each person has a childhood 
in which a cultural heritage is transmitted, ready for adolescent rejection 
and adult discriminating selection and contribution.  Persons come after 
and before other persons. . . .  Persons are beings who have some sort of 
personality, and although one may think of a personality in abstraction 
from its formation . . . all our understanding of personality relates to its 
genesis, and for us, that is in the conditions of biological life, in which 
one generation nurtures its successor generation, preparing it to take 
its place.   Persons are essentially successors, heirs to other persons who 
formed and cared for them, and their personality is revealed both in their 
relations to others and in their response to their own recognized genesis. 
Not only does each earlier phase causally influence each later phase, as 
in all enduring beings, not only is there growth, maturation and aging, as 
in all living things, but in persons each later phase is a response to earlier 
phases, caused not only by them but by some sort of partial representation 
of them and their historical and causal relationships. . . . The paradigm 
persons are natural persons, animals whose long and helpless infancy 
enables them to become educated and cultured and speaking  animals. 
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Because they have the time for play, culture, convention, and artifice, 
they can not only form new natural persons, but invent gods and create 
artificial persons, corporations, and states.  Persons are the creation of 
persons.  [“Cartesian Persons”, pp. 84-6]   
[A5]    Being conscious is not enough to make one a person.  For that we 
need Cartesian consciousness, consciousness of ourselves and our place in 
the world, not merely consciousness of the relevant stimuli to what is in 
fact self-maintenance in that world . . . Through participation in discourse, 
through being addressed and learning to address the child moves from 
consciousness to self-consciousness, and full Cartesian consciousness. 
[“Cartesian Persons,” pp. 88-9]
[B]  Annette Baier: A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s  
 Treatise (Harvard University Press, 1991) pp. 140-141.  
It is the fact that human persons are essentially incarnate, that they are 
flesh and blood, generated, born of women, coming into the world complete 
with blood ties, and acquiring other social ties as they mature, grow and 
with others’ help acquire self-consciousness, that banishes the ghost of the 
Book One worry,’“Who am I or what?”   I am a living, more or less loved 
and more or less loving person among persons.  The “real connexion” that 
Book One and the “Appendix” despaired of finding is not to be found by 
fragmenting a person-history into separate perceptions, out of physical 
or social space, but by seeing persons as other persons see them, as living 
(really connected) bodies, with real biological connections to other 
persons, in a common social space, depending on them for much of our 
knowledge, depending on them for the sustaining of our pleasures and for 
the comfort in our pain, depending on them also for what independence 
and autonomy we come to acquire. . . Hume believes that “we can form 
no wish, which has not a reference to society. . .”
 
[C] Passages from Annette Baier: “A Naturalist View of
Persons” Presidential Address, Eastern Division Meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association 1990.  Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 65 (1991) 5-17; reprinted in the paperback edition 
of Baier’s Moral Prejudices.
[C1]   I take a naturalist view of persons . . . to emphasize the 
interdependency of persons.   Persons are born to earlier persons, and 
learn the arts of personhood from other persons.  These arts include the 
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self-consciousness that follows from mutual recognition, along with the 
sort of representation that makes speech possible. . . Our personhood is 
responsive, called into full expression by other persons who treat us as 
one of them. [p.5]
[C2]   We naturalists see persons as intelligent, talkative, playful mammals 
who have become conscious of ourselves, of our mammalian nature, its 
possibilities and the constraints it imposes.  As we become conscious of our 
actual origins and history, we become aware of the wide range of capacities 
that go into our personhood.  We can then see our intelligence . . . in 
relation to the intelligence of other smart animals, our communicative 
and expressive powers in relationship to theirs, our linguistic powers in 
the context of our other powers of expression and representation, and so 
on for all our multiple arts of personhood. [pp. 13-14]
[C3]  In carefully distinguishing the identity of the person both from 
that of “the Man” and from that of any soul substance enabling a man 
to do his thinking and other soulful activities, Locke writes that if “same 
immaterial soul” made “same man,” then we would have to allow for 
the possibility that the same man could be “born of different women 
and in distant times”.  It will be not qua man, but rather qua soul or qua 
person, that Socrates, as in Locke’s example, might be born twice, once 
in Athens and once in Queensborough.  Birth is his origin as a man, but 
not as soul or person.  Qua person, he has no mother or an accidental 
mother, or perhaps exchangeable ones.  (It is interesting how Locke takes 
it for granted that the meaning of “same woman” and “different woman” 
is clearly fixed by biological and genealogical niche, in order to do his 
thought experiments on what “same man” should be taken to imply. 
Women, it seems, are to keep their biological places, while male persons 
plan their biology-transcending time travels.)  Locke in these thoughts 
about thinking persons is in effect agreeing with Descartes, who in the 
Third Meditation declared that his human parents . . . “are not in any sense 
authors of my being, in as far as I am a thinking thing.”  A naturalist, on 
the other hand, takes it as obvious that a person is, as Montaigne put it, 
“marvelously corporeal” and that a person’s ability to think is affected 
by genetic inheritance from parents and is vitally dependent on the sort 
of care it received in childhood, for example in being introduced into 
a language community.  So naturalists see persons as having person-
progenitors and person-parents who cared for them.  [7] 
[C4]  Do Kantian persons . . . have person-progenitors?  At any rate, it 
seems clear that in this tradition, persons do not need mothers.  As a 
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contemporary philosopher puts it, “What is important about us is that 
we are persons.  One’s dignity does not depend on one’s parentage, even 
to the extent of being born of woman, or born at all.”   And now we 
have got to that vital Kantian conceptual link between personhood and 
dignity.  To be a person is not to be born of woman, nor indeed to be 
born at all, but to spring forth from some fertile noumenal field of Ares 
fully formed and upright.  Some philosophers who, like Locke and Kant, 
distinguish our personhood from our living human presence, are willing 
to say quite straightforwardly that infants, who so  obviously are lively 
and do have parents, and whose dignity is not immediately obvious, are 
not yet persons.   “Person” is always a status term: by these philosophers 
it is reserved for those at least trying out a dignified gait or mien.   It is 
not our ability to tease or play (an ability which infants display better 
than most adults), but our upright stature, our would-be commanding 
presence, our pretensions to importance, that are decreed by the founding 
and sustaining members of the fraternity of persons to be the qualifications 
for membership.  Persons, especially if they are men, matter, and they 
decree who and what matters.   “We are beings to whom things matter,” 
they self-importantly proclaim.  Aristotle, who of course did fairly 
straightforwardly profess the belief that persons had accidental mothers 
and essential fathers, launched a still flourishing tradition of finding moral 
significance in our upright posture (ours, that is, after infancy and before 
the decrepitude of old age).  We are the descendants of homo erectus, 
we are told by our wise men the anthropologists.   (Could it be that men 
have a thing about uprightness?)   A recent male writer, who stresses that 
“to be a person is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of worth,” 
. . . finds symbolic significance in our particular mode of strutting. . . . 
Not our clever and expressive hands, nor our capacity for laughing at 
strutters, let alone our variations on the eyebrow flash and the shoulder 
shrug, but our upright heaven-gazing stance, and our spectator-conscious 
respect-demanding walk. [pp. 7-8].     
[C5]     Naturalistically-minded philosophers such as David Hume, and 
philosophically inclined naturalists such as Charles Darwin, have gently 
reminded these dignity fetishists and aspirants to uprightness that birds 
too are two-footed and can strut and look aloft and before they soar 
aloft, and that gorillas can be imposingly self-important. . . .  Yet . . . 
we nourish the Lockean and Kantian notion that to be a person is to 
altogether transcend biological nature, to enter into some supernatural 
realm where we are no longer essentially related to and dependent on 
others, unless we choose such relationships.   In that relation we are no 
longer born to others, with a place in a sequence of mortal generations, 
but rather autonomous responsible egos, each separately possessed of the 
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dignity, the “unconditional incomparable worth, of one destined to stand 
alone before his own conscience, that “representative within us of the 
divine judgment seat,” as Kant puts it. [pp.7-9]
[C6]    Paradoxically, it is the very will to identify oneself as a lasting 
remembering self that prompts these generation-forgetting and death-
transcending modern whimsies, if not of doing without parents, at least 
of switching one’s own for Garbo’s, if not of being immortal, at least of 
becoming a potentially endless series of successive “selves”.   It is Locke’s 
memory criterion . . . that is thought to license these ignorings of actual 
biological origins, actual pasts there to be recalled, and to encourage 
these fantasized transfigurations, as persons wander freely across the gene 
pool, from memory to memory and from gender to gender.  For strictly, 
on Locke’s criterion, a person is one who was born only if he remembers 
being born, was dependent on others only if he remembers the dependency. 
The autonomous adolescent person, if he has succeeded in forgetting 
that he was a heteronomous child, can rightly disown that childhood 
as his.  These fantasies of freedom from our own actual history, actual 
dependency, actual mortality, actual biological limitations and determinate 
possibilities, have on the whole been male fantasies, and many women 
philosophers have found them strange.   Susan Wolf sensibly says: “my 
reasons for being interested in persons never had much to do with my 
beliefs about their metaphysical composition.”   Accepting a metaphysical 
“reduction” of persons into a sequence of conscious experiences or doings 
need not, she claims, in any way alter our conception of more-central-than-
metaphysical aspects of persons as we view them and as we are concerned 
with them.  On a generous construal, we might see these male fantasies 
as the Y chromosome trying to disown itself.   It is unlikely that women, 
who have traditionally been allocated the care of very dependent young 
and old persons, will take persons as anything except interdependent 
persons.  It is just as unlikely that women can pretend that new persons 
come into being in any other way than by being born of women, after 
a conception for which two persons are jointly responsible, in all cases 
except those resulting from rape or from the seduction of the non-culpably 
ignorant. . . .  Now of course many women philosophers do participate 
in the neo-Lockean metaphysical thought experiments, just as there are 
women Kantians and there have always been eager women adherents 
of patriarchal religions.  Women’s reputation for docility is not entirely 
unearned, and often it has been our best survival strategy. [p. 12]1   
[C7] . . . “person” is a status term, and it is our term.  It is we who 
have to decide what that status is and whether to give it to a human 
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fetus, to other animals, to corporations. . . Sometimes one wishes we 
could just drop the term . . . But words are hard to kill.  The only realistic 
strategy is to make do with the old concept, heavily burdened though 
it is.  Like Hume, we can try to rethink, debunk, and level all its elitist 
implications, to see our intelligence as just one among many forms of 
“reason in animals,” our much vaunted dignity as just a variant of the 
peacock’s pride or what Jenny Teichman recently demoted to “the rooster 
factor”, our interesting games as just one form of animal play.  [p. 13]
[D] Passages from John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human
 Understanding, the second edition appearing in 1694.    
[D1]    Locke’s definition of ‘person’  [Essay II.xxvii.9]    
. . . we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking 
intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self 
as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which 
it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, 
and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to 
perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive.  When we see, hear, 
taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so.  Thus it is 
always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every 
one is to himself, that which he calls self:  It not being considered in this 
case, whether the same self be continued in the same, or divers Substances 
[i.e., in the same material bodies or the same immaterial souls].   For since 
consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ’tis that, that makes every 
one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all 
other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e., sameness 
of a rational Being.  And as far as this consciousness can be extended 
backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of 
that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and ’tis by the same self 
with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done. 
[D2] Locke’s original “thought experiment” [Essay II.xxvii.14-15]:    
 
14.  Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, [a] that he has in 
himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in 
the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is that which 
he calls himself. 2 
Let him also suppose [b] it to be the same Soul, that was in Nestor or 
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Thersites , at the Siege of Troy, (For Souls being, as far as we know any 
thing of them in their Nature, indifferent to any parcel of Matter, the 
Supposition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been, as 
well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man:  
But [c] he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either 
of Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person 
with either of them?  Can he be concerned in either of their Actions? 
Attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the Actions 
of any other Man, that ever existed? 
So that [d] this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of 
either of those Men, he is no more one self with either of them, than if 
the Soul or immaterial Spirit, that now informs him, had been created, 
and began to exist, when it began to inform his present Body, though it 
were never so true, that the same Spirit that informed Nestor’s or Thersite’s 
Body, were numerically the same that now informs his.  For this would 
no more make him the same Person with Nestor, than if some of the 
Particles of Matter, that were once a part of Nestor, were now a part of 
this Man, the same immaterial Substance without the same consciousness, 
no more making the same Person by being united to any Body, than the 
same Particle of Matter without consciousness united to any Body, makes 
the same Person.  But let him once find himself conscious of any of the 
Actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same Person with Nestor. 
15. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the 
same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make 
or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going alone 
with the soul that inhabits it.  But yet the Soul alone in the change of 
Bodies, would scarce to anyone, but to him that makes the Soul the Man, be 
enough to make the same Man.   For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying 
with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past Life, enter and inform the 
Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, 
he [viz. the subject that then has the Cobler’s body] would be the same 
Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince’s Actions:  But 
who would say it was the same Man?   For the Body too goes to making 
the Man . . . 3
[E] Parfit’s neo-Lockean “thought experiments” from Reasons and Persons
  (Oxford University Press, 1984).  
 
[E1] Parfit’s “fission” case, from Reasons and Persons, pp. 254-5:    
 I would survive [1] if my brain was successfully transplanted into my 
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twin’s body. And I could survive [2] with only half my brain, the other
half having been destroyed.  Given these two facts, it seems clear that 
I would survive [3] if half of my brain was successfully transplanted into 
my twin’s body, and the other half was destroyed.4  
What [then] if the other half was not destroyed?   This is the case 
that Wiggins described: that in which a person, like an amoeba, divides.5 
To simplify the case, I assume that I am one of three identical triplets. 
Consider: 
[4]  My Division:  My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two 
brothers.  My brain is divided, and each half is successfully transplanted 
into the body of one of my brothers.  Each of the resulting people believes 
that he is me, seems to remember living my life, has my character, and 
is in every other way psychologically continuous with me.  And he has 
a body that is very like mine.  
This case is likely to remain impossible. . . [But] given the aims of my 
discussion, this does not matter.  [The main] impossibility [viz., that of 
dividing the lower brain in a way that does not impair functioning] is 
merely technical.   The one feature of the case that might be held to be 
deeply impossible – the division of a person’s consciousness into two separate 
streams – is the feature that has actually happened.  It would have been 
important if this had been impossible, since this might have supported . 
. . the claim that we are indivisible Cartesian Egos. . . There seems to be 
no similar connection between a particular view about what we really are 
and the impossibility of dividing and successfully transplanting the two 
halves of the lower brain.   This impossibility thus provides no ground 
for refusing to consider the imagined case . . . And considering this case 
may help us to decide both what we believe ourselves to be, and what we 
in fact are.  . . . [This imagined case] provides a further argument against 
the view that we are separately existing entities.  But the main conclusion 
to be drawn is that personal identity is not what matters.6   
[E2]     Parfit’s “Combined Spectrum Argument”, from Reasons 
and Persons, pp. 236-7. 
At the near end of this spectrum is the normal case in which a future 
person would be fully continuous with me as I am now, both physically 
and psychologically.  This person would be me in just the way that, in my 
actual life, it will be me who wakes up tomorrow.  At the far end of this 
spectrum the resulting person would have no continuity with me now, 
either physically or psychologically. In this case, the scientists would 
destroy my brain and body, and then create, out of new organic matter, a 
perfect Replica of someone else. Let us suppose this person to be. . . Greta 
Garbo.   We can suppose that, when Garbo was 30, a group of scientists 
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recorded the states of all the cells in her brain and body.  
In the first case in this spectrum, at the near end, nothing would be 
done.  In the second case, a few of the cells in my brain and body would 
be replaced.  The new cells would not be exact duplicates.  As a result, 
there would be somewhat less psychological connectedness between 
me and the person who wakes up.  This person would not have all my 
memories, and his character would be in one way like mine.  He would have 
some apparent memories of Greta Garbo’s life, and have one of Garbo’s 
characteristics.   Unlike me, he would enjoy acting.  His body would also 
be in one way less like mine, and more like Garbo’s.  His eyes would be 
more like Garbo’s eyes.  Further along the spectrum, a larger percentage 
of my cells would be replaced, again with dissimilar cells.  The resulting 
person would be in fewer ways psychologically connected with me, and in 
more ways connected with Garbo, as she was at 30.  And there would be 
similar changes in this person’s body.  Near the far end, most of my cells 
would be replaced with dissimilar cells.  The person who wakes up would 
have only a few of the cells in my original brain and body, and between 
her and me there would be only a few psychological connections.  She 
would have a few apparent memories that fit my past, and a few of my 
habits and desires.  But in every other way she would be, both physically 
and psychologically, just like Garbo. 
These cases provide, I believe, a strong argument for the Reductionist 
view.  The argument again assumes that our psychological features depend 
on the states of our brains. . . In the case at the far end, the scientists destroy 
my brain and body, and then make, out of new matter, a Replica of Greta 
Garbo. There would be no connection, of any kind, between me and the 
resulting person.  It could not be clearer that the resulting person would 
not be me.   [So we cannot say, as we could say in the physical spectrum 
(where my psychology is held constant but different percentages of my 
cells are replaced) or in the psychological spectrum (where my matter is 
held constant but different percentages of my psychological states are 
replaced) that the resulting person would in every case be me.]   We are 
forced to choose between . . . [saying that] somewhere in this Spectrum, 
there is a sharp borderline . . .  [and saying that there is no sharp borderline 
and that] in the central cases, it would be an empty question whether 
the resulting person would be me.    [Since it is extremely implausible 
to suppose that there is a sharp borderline] this Spectrum provides, as I 
claimed, a strong argument for the Reductionist view [according to which 
personal identity consists simply in psychological continuity].   
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Notes to Appendix
1 Here Baier appends the note saying, “I myself meekly did the philosophy 
that men had initially instructed me to do, and rewarded me for doing, until 
I safely had tenure.”
2 I have inserted the letters here to help those unfamiliar with Locke grasp 
the structure of the passsage.  [a] describes the “Cartesian” identification of a 
Person with his Soul.  [b] and [c] then raise the question whether mere sameness 
of soul, in the absence of psychological connections such as those afforded 
by memory, would suffice for sameness of Person.   And [d] presents Locke’s 
conclusion (with some argument for it) that mere sameness of soul would not 
suffice for sameness of Person: continuity of what Locke calls “conciousness” 
is also necessary (and in Locke’s view sufficient) for sameness of Person, as 
distinct from sameness of Man (or sameness of Human Animal), which Locke 
goes on to discuss in section 15. 
3 Locke is relying here on the definition of Person set out in [D1].  
4 I have inserted the numbers here to make the structure of the passage clear. 
Parfit seeks primarily to establish the possibility described in [3] by appealing 
to two sets of what we might call “natural” facts: [1] those associated with the 
sorts of loss of function of one cerebral hemisphere that sometimes occur in 
cases of stroke or injury, and [2] those associated with “split-brain” patients 
whose right and left cerebral hemispheres can (at least in certain circumstances) 
function independently of one another after the corpus callosum connection 
the two hemispheres has been severed.  
5 Parfit is referring to an example from p. 50 of David Wiggins’ Identity and 
Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Basil Blackwell, 1967).  It is an interesting question 
whether Baier would consider the sort of amoeba-like fission described byWiggins 
as more (or less) “naturalistic” than the sort of fission that Parfit here asks us to 
imagine; and also which (if either) we should think more (or less) “naturalistic”. 
6 Parfit’s argument is, very roughly, that what I care about in survival is preserved 
in this case, and preserved “twice over”: so, since neither of the products is 
strictly identical to me, he concludes that “what matters” in survival is not 
identity in the strict numerical sense, but rather psychological continuity.
Notice that Parfit moves in this passage from claiming that consideration of 
such cases can help us to decide both (a) what we believe ourselves to be and 
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(b) what we in fact are to claiming that case shows something about “what 
matters”– i.e., that personal identity is not “what matters”.    It is often objected 
that consideration of such cases can show us (a) what we believe ourselves to 
be, and perhaps also what we do care about, but not (b) what we in fact are, 
nor “what matters” in the sense of what we should care about.   I have argued 
elsewhere that a neo-Lockean who takes certain patterns of concern (as I 
do) to be partly constitutive of a person’s identity over time can take claims 
about what we do care about as evidence of what we really are.  See my “Back 
to ‘The Self and the Future’” in Philosophical Topics: The Philosophy of Sydney 
Shoemaker 1999.    
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